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Abstract 
Consumer IoT devices often lack adequate in-built security, 
giving rise to newer forms of threats and crime risks.  Security 
should be designed into devices but at present there is little 
incentive for manufacturers to do so consistently. Additionally, 
consumers are not given simple information at the point of 
purchase, in user manuals or other materials to help them 
assess the security of devices. Consumers are therefore not 
afforded the opportunity to understand the level of security 
devices offer. Consumer rating indices (e.g. food traffic light 
labels) can provide this opportunity to aid consumer choice. 
 
This research aims to co-develop a consumer security index 
(CSI), with consumers and security experts, to aid consumer 
decision making and incentivise greater security provision in 
the manufacture of IoT devices. In this paper, we focus on the 
methodology for the development of the index. 
 
Through a focus group with IoT security experts, Study 1 will 
identify security features that consumer IoT devices should 
provide. Study 2 will employ an online survey to identify 
consumer preferences concerning the disclosure of security 
and privacy features that devices provide, and focus groups 
will help to co-design the CSI by discussing the information 
value, appeal and likely engagement of a security index label. 
To better understand the current situation, Study 3 will develop 
a matrix of different classes of IoT devices manually coded 
according to the CSI for a sample of devices. Study 4 will 
explore the use of natural language processing to extract data 
from device user manuals to identify what information is 
communicated about the security features, as well as, what 
crime prevention messaging is provided by manufacturers.  
 
The project will use a formal methodology to develop a CSI 
that is co-designed with experts and consumers.  The ultimate 
aims are to encourage the use of the index to help inform 
consumer choice, and to lever market action so that IoT devices 





The Internet of Things (IoT) brings increasing physical-cyber 
convergence by providing everyday devices with internet 
connectivity. For consumers, these devices afford greater 
convenience, physical security and safety but also bring new 
and unanticipated crime risks associated with their use. For 
example, consumer IoT devices have been exploited to disrupt 
access to popular websites such as Netflix and Twitter [1], 
children’s toys shown to be able to record conversations [2] 
and baby monitors able to record daily routines and activities 
[3]. These exploits have largely arisen due to a lack of adequate 
security built into consumer IoT devices [4]. 
 
A lack of security is driven in part by manufacturers desire to 
be first to market and a lack of incentive to secure devices [5]. 
This has resulted in manufacturers neglecting thorough and 
extensive testing of devices before they are sold to consumers. 
As a result, the burden for protecting devices is often left to the 
consumer, who may have little or no knowledge of how to do 
this. Since it is the manufacturers who have the most 
competency to act, to secure the Internet of Things, devices 
need to be secure by design and have security features built in. 
One route to incentivising greater security provision is through 
a label provided at the point of purchase.  This would enable 
consumers to make informed choices, and make explicit what 
manufacturers should aspire to. As such, there have been calls 
for a security trust label [6], [7] or a security rating scheme for 
consumer IoT devices [8], [9]. 
 
In the 1980s, few vehicles had integrated immobilisers, or even 
central locking systems. Despite pressure to do so, 
manufacturers had little incentive to address this. This changed 
when the consumer association Which? campaigned to 
highlight the issues to consumers and the Home Office 
published the car theft index [10].  These activities acted as a 
lever to encourage industry to manufacture vehicles with 
security features as standard, or risk reputational damage.  The 
aim of these four studies is to pursue this in the case of 
consumer IoT devices through the generation of a simple 
consumer security index.  Our intention would be to co-design 
the index with industry experts, consumers, retailers and 
government to develop a consumer rating index that can be 
easily understood and to develop simple guidance they can 
follow to reduce their susceptibility to IoT security threats. 
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Alongside security, consumer privacy concerns inhibit the 
adoption of IoT devices [11].  IoT devices generate (and share) 
lots of data about consumers that directly and indirectly reveal 
their activities and habits [12]. Companies profit from such 
information through targeted advertising and selling 
information to third parties. However, companies are often not 
transparent about the type of information they collect and how 
it is used. When they are transparent, this is often obscured by 
burying the details in terms and conditions or a privacy policy, 
which consumers are unlikely to read. Consumers want more 
information about, and control over the data about them that 
organisations collect, use and share [13]. Research has shown 
that a lack of transparency impacts on consumer trust and that 
consumers would trust companies more if they were 
transparent about their data collection practices [14]. We seek 
to address what and how privacy-related information or 
features should be communicated to consumers. 
 
Currently, there is no accessible way for consumers to 
understand the security of a device.  This contrasts with the 
energy efficiency of electronic devices, which in the UK are 
labelled from A to F to indicate their energy consumption. 
Presently, if consumers want to protect their internet connected 
devices, they are required to research the security of the device 
before purchasing [15]. This would need significant behaviour 
change by enhancing consumers’ capability (to research and 
understand security concepts and features) and motivation (to 
prioritise researching security above the functionality, 
aesthetics, and price of a device) [16].  A security index helps 
reduce this burden through informing consumers by providing 
easy to understand information at point of sale. A label allows 
consumers to choose a device that meets their privacy and 
security needs. Manufacturers, on the other hand, can use the 
label to provide this information to their consumers and to 
differentiate themselves from competing brands, whilst also 
championing best practice in the security of consumer IoT.   
Furthermore, a label may also be beneficial in evaluating cyber 
insurance claims [17] by providing a visual means to assess 
associated risks of IoT devices.  
 
As governments adopt approaches to encourage self-regulation 
in markets, the provision of labels at point of sale appears to be 
an increasingly popular tool, with traffic light systems being 
used for nutritional content in food and for energy efficiency 
in electronic goods. The intent of these labels is to 
simultaneously improve the devices and to aid consumer 
choice. Research suggests that the efficacy and uptake of labels 
is dependent on the degree to which they are implemented and 
accessible to consumers. For example, compared to energy 
labels that use numeric scales, those that use alphabetic ones 
lead to more consumers buying energy efficient devices [18]. 
It is important that a security label that is designed to aid 
consumer choice has value, appeal and can be understood by 
the target population. Co-designing the label with consumers 
is intended to ensure it influences their behaviour.  
 
In addition to providing adequate security features (e.g. strong 
password protection), user compliance is important too.  If the 
use of security features is optional or requires user intervention, 
users can elect not to employ them, or can do so half-heartedly 
(e.g. using weak passwords), compromising the effectiveness 
of any measures in place.  Users may not employ particular 
security features because they are simply not aware that such 
features exist, the implementation of the security features does 
not follow usable security best practice, or because they do not 
know how to configure them.  Alternatively, they may 
understand what the features are, but purposefully decide not 
to use them (e.g. using an existing password rather than 
creating a new one).  User compliance, and improving this (e.g. 
not allowing the device to function where default passwords 
are used) is consequently perhaps as important as the security 
features themselves. However, manufacturers may not 
adequately explain the importance of the security features in 
user manuals. There is a lack of research around how 
manufacturers communicate to users about features in manuals 
and the types of crime prevention messaging they may adopt 
to influence consumer behaviour change. Consequently, we 
seek to address how security features and crime prevention 
advice is explained to consumers in device manuals.  
 
For the CSI to influence the market and consumer choice, a 
number of issues will need to be addressed. First, unlike 
existing labelling schemes, such as those for energy efficiency, 
the resilience of a device to attack changes over time as 
vulnerabilities are discovered and new hacking methods 
developed. Second, there are challenges with objectively 
measuring security as the IoT is complex and involves multiple 
components such as hardware, apps and the cloud [19]. Third, 
unlike food labelling and energy efficiency, there is an 
adversary in the cybersecurity context. Thus, a potential 
unintended consequence of an incorrectly implemented label is 
that it would provide offenders with specific information on 
device vulnerabilities that they could exploit. Hence, it is 
equally important that the label does not provide further routes 
for exploitation. Next, we outline previous approaches to 
security rating scales and how they address such issues.  
 
Loi et al. (2017) recently developed a rating index which 
involves security tests to assess four dimensions of security: (i) 
confidentiality of data, (ii) integrity and authentication of 
device connections, (iii) control and availability of device to 
connection requests, and (iv) capability of device to participate 
in attacks.  They assessed 20 consumer IoT devices on the four 
dimensions to provide a three tier rating scale from “secure”, 
“moderately secure” to “insecure”. They found that all devices 
tested had shortcomings in one of the four dimensions, 
highlighting issues in the security of consumer IoT. They did 
not address the issue of the security posture of a device 
changing over time but do provide an objective way of 
measuring the security of IoT devices. However, this approach 
requires significant testing which could significantly increase 
the price of cheaper classes of IoT devices and be a barrier to 
market entry for start-ups and small businesses.  
 
Others have suggested alternatives to the explicit testing of IoT 
devices in the deviceion a rating system. Jamieson (2016) 
argues that a rating system can be based on the “vulnerability 
surface” of a device. Jamieson defines this as the interfaces, 
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processing attack surface, and system architecture of a device. 
Devices with more interfaces and a greater attack surface are 
considered less objectively secure, whereas the specific system 
architecture can either help or hinder the device security. 
Jamieson outlines the Logical Security Posture (LSP) as a 
metric to measure this in which points are assigned for the 
presence of security features and points deducted for features 
that increase the attack surface. They argue that such a rating 
system represents the device’s resistance to attack and that a 
device’s security is dependent upon a manufacturer’s 
commitment to providing updates, with stars lost for not doing 
so. They also consider the issue of the longevity of “security” 
by explicitly stating the years for which the rating applies. 
Finally, they suggest a follow up service for on-site inspections 
which can remove stars if the design of the device has been 
surreptitiously changed. 
 
The CSI seeks to build on this initial work by Jamieson (2016) 
and provides some further advantages over these existing 
approaches.  Firstly, it will be systematically designed with 
experts and users and co-ordinated with industry and 
government rather than a single entity.  Integrating consumers 
in to the design process helps ensure that the label will 
influence consumer choice and manufacturer aspirations as 
intended. The CSI will also go beyond labelling as it focuses 
on heightening consumer awareness through manuals and 
addressing crime prevention messaging to influence behaviour 
change in consumers.  
 
In this paper, we detail a protocol which outline a methodology 
for developing the security index.  Protocols are increasingly 
used in science, particularly disciplines such as medicine and 
health psychology. They help improve the standard of research 
[20] by (i) allowing researchers to obtain feedback on study 
designs through peer review, (ii) enabling readers to compare 
what was originally intended with what was actually done in 
future publications, which prevents p-hacking and post-hoc 
revision of study aims, and (iii) enabling researchers, funders 
and policy makers to see what studies are underway and reduce 
potential research duplication.  The work outlined here is being 
conducted in parallel to a systematic review of crimes that can 
be facilitated by consumer IoT devices. 
1.1 Overall Aims 
To co-develop a consumer security index (CSI), with 
consumers and security experts, to aid consumer decision 
making and incentivise greater security provision in the 
manufacture of consumer IoT devices.  In the sections that 
follow, we outline the aims of each study in more detail and 







2 Study 1: Security and privacy features of 
consumer IoT devices 
2.1 Aim 
The aim of Study 1 is to identify security and privacy features 
of consumer IoT devices by using expert consensus methods to 
elicit and encapsulate current thinking.  
2.2 Methods 
 
2.2.1 Participants  
Participants will be seven IoT security experts with extensive 
experience in the security of IoT consumer devices.   
 
The experts will be recruited via email from those who have 
previously participated or are associated with the PETRAS 
Internet of Things Research Hub, from an expert advisory 
panel assembled for the Secure by Design policy review 
conducted by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and 
Sport (DCMS), and from scientific and professional societies 
and centres (Dawes Centre for Future Crime at UCL, Research 
Institute in the Science of Cybersecurity) and from government 
departments (National Cyber Security Centre, Home Office 
and the DCMS). We will also use snowball sampling by asking 
for recommendations from those already recruited. We will 
seek to a gain balance of experts from academia, government, 
retail, and industry.  
 
To ensure the suitability of the sample, potential participants 
will be asked to complete a self-assessment questionnaire to 
evaluate their relevant expertise in IoT security. Questionnaires 
assessing expertise have been shown to be a predictor of initial 
accuracy of judgement in expert consensus exercises [21]. 
Participants will be included if they rate their expertise in IoT 
security as ≥5 (on a 7-point scale, where 0 indicates ‘no 
expertise’ and 7 indicates ‘profound expertise’). We will also 




2.2.2.1 Consensus Development Method 
The Nominal Group Technique (NGT) will be used for formal 
consensus development [22]. NGT allows feasible and reliable 
facilitation of face-to-face group discussion through explicit 
and replicable steps to reach consensus on a topic of discussion 
[23]. Compared to conventional focus groups which aim to 
discuss an issue in-depth, consensus methods such as NGT also 
allow for prioritisation or agreement on solutions [23]. The 
structured format of NGT also prevents the domination of a 
single participant and encourages all members to participate in 
discussions [24].   
 
We will run a focus group with the experts and follow the four 
key stages of NGT: 
1. Silent generation – Prior to the workshop, 
participants will be sent a series of questions 
regarding key security and privacy features for 
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consumer IoT and also allowed up to 20 minutes in 
the workshop to reflect on their responses [25]. 
These features will be based on the DCMS’s Secure 
by Design Code of Practice for Consumer IoT and 
other related guidance and principles.  
2. Recording ideas – During this stage, participants 
will be asked (one at a time) to provide a single idea 
to the group in a “round robin” fashion. Each 
response will be recorded and no debate allowed. 
New ideas will be welcomed but participants will be 
required to wait their turn.  The process will continue 
until no new ideas are generated.  
3. Clarification – At this stage, participants may 
propose the exclusion, inclusion or modification of 
ideas [26].  They may also discuss the clarity and 
importance of each item [24]. With group 
agreement, ideas will be clustered and all ideas 
discussed to ensure participant understanding [27].  
4. Voting – Participants will privately vote on their top 
preferences from the generated ideas. Votes will 
then be tallied to identify ideas that are rated highly.  
 
2.2.3 Data Analysis 
Participants’ responses will be presented in a ranked tally table, 
with security features that have a greater percentage agreement 
considered to be most important for the index. The following 
questions will be addressed through the analysis: 
 
1. What proportion of experts rate certain features 
higher than others? 
2. What features are ranked most and least highly? 
 
 
3 Study 2: Consumer preferences for the CSI 
3.1 Aim 
The aims of Study 2 are to i) identify consumer preferences 
concerning the disclosure of security and privacy features that 
devices provide (Study 2a) and ii) co-design the label by 
discussing the information value, appeal and likely 
engagement with a security index label (Study 2 a/b). 
 
3.2 Study 2a 
To gain insight into consumers’ preferences, we will conduct 
an online study in which participants will be asked to rank 
security and privacy-related features that they would like to be 




3.3.1 Participants  
 
Participants will be eligible to take part if they i) are aged ≥ 18 
years and ii) live in the UK. We will aim to gain a quota sample 
of 1000 participants representative of the UK population in 
terms of age and sex and will recruit participants through the 
online panel company “prolific.ac”. 
 
3.3.2 Design  
The study will use a between-subjects design with groups 
asked about different types of consumer IoT device. 
Participants will be asked about specific devices (as opposed 
to an unspecified device) to ensure that they use the same frame 
of reference when answering questions.  This is to avoid any 
confounding effects that might otherwise arise. The 
independent variable will be the type of IoT device (Wi-Fi 
Router, Smart TV, Smart Thermostat, Smart Watch and Smart 
Security Camera) selected from the most popular sold 
consumer IoT devices on Amazon. The dependent variable will 
be the ranking of importance of security and privacy-related 
information.  
 
3.3.3 Stimuli  
Participants will be asked to rank order approximately 17 items 
covering both security and privacy-related information that 
they would like to be communicated to them. An example 
security-related item is “The device’s support period (how long 
the device will receive security updates until it is no longer 
supported)” and an example privacy-related item is “Whether 
my personal data is shared with third party companies”. The 
items will be developed based on previous research on 
labelling schemes (e.g. [28]) and through discussion with 
academics and industry.  
 
3.3.4 Procedure 
Participants will first be provided with information about the 
study and asked to provide consent to take part. They will then 
be allocated to one of five device conditions. Next, they will be 
provided with information about existing labelling schemes 
they may be familiar with (e.g. the traffic light system used for 
food devices and energy efficiency labels). They will then be 
informed that we are interested in developing a similar label 
for internet connected devices based on what is important to 
consumers.  Participants will be asked to rank what information 
they would like the label to communicate to them before 
purchase for the device they were allocated to consider and 
provided with a short description of each feature alongside 
each item. 
 
3.3.5 Data Analysis 
The following questions will be addressed: 
 
1. Do participant rankings significantly differ by type of 
IoT device? 
2. What features are ranked most and least highly by 
consumers? 
 
3.4 Study 2b 
To gain further insight into consumers’ preferences and to co-




Participants will be eligible to take part if they i) are aged ≥ 18 
years and ii) live in the UK. We will obtain an opportunity 
sample of participants who live in London and surrounding 
areas, recruited via UCL and through the user partners of the 
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PETRAS Internet of Things Research Hub. Seven participants 
will be recruited per focus group. Will run 2-3 focus groups 
until saturation is reached [29].   
 
3.4.2 Design and procedure 
The workshop will last approximately 2 hours and will be 
facilitated by the lead author.  
 
The workshop will cover the following topic areas: 
• The role and value of a security label and their likely 
engagement 
• Preferences around security and privacy features  
• The appeal of different concepts of label designs 
 
Following introductions, participants will be asked to discuss 
their opinions and concerns around the security and privacy of 
consumer IoT devices (15 mins) as a warm up activity. They 
will then discuss the role of a security label and their likely 
engagement (25 mins). Subsequently, participants will discuss 
the key security and privacy features as identified in Study 2a 
(40 mins). As a final activity (40 mins), participants will be 
shown the label concepts one by one and asked to score them 
individually on a 1–10 scale and write down their likes and 
dislikes for each one. They will then discuss each concept as a 
group and be probed further to express their thoughts and 
understanding of the labels. At the end of the session, 
respondents will be asked to share any final thoughts.  
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
The following questions will be addressed: 
• What are participants’ thoughts on the role and value 
of a security label and their likely engagement? 
• What features are considered most and least important 
by consumers? 
• Which label design concepts are most preferred by 
participants and why? 
 
4 Study 3: IoT devices coded to the CSI 
4.1 Aim 
The aim of Study 3 is to develop a matrix of different classes 
of IoT devices manually coded according to the CSI for a 
sample of devices.  
 
4.2 Method 
We will obtain a representative sample of 40 open source user 
manuals for different classes of consumer IoT devices sold by 
high-street retailers and systematically code them to extract 
information on the security features they provide.   
 
A coding scheme will be developed based on the findings from 
study 1 and study 2. We will also discuss and refine the coding 
scheme with the expert panel assembled for Study 1.  This will 
ensure that the coding scheme is fit for purpose and that we 
have not missed any important details. 
 
We will use framework analysis [30] to code for the presence 
or absence of security and privacy features according to the 
coding scheme. Framework analysis allows the coding scheme 
to be further refined through themes that may emerge through 
the qualitative analysis of the user manuals that were 
unaccounted for in the initial coding scheme.   
To ensure inter-rater reliability, during a pilot exercise prior to 
the main activity, two raters will be trained to use the coding 
strategy, and they will independently code a sample of user 
manuals.  Their ratings will subsequently be compared using 
indices of inter-rater reliability (e.g. Cohen’s Kappa) and the 
coding strategy updated, or further training provided, as 
necessary.  Coder drift, which can occur when a coder changes 
how they apply the coding criteria over time, will also be 
monitored throughout the coding exercise. 
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
The following questions will be addressed: 
• What security and privacy features are currently 
offered by consumer IoT devices? 
• How does the presence or absence of these features 
differ across classes of consumer IoT devices? 
 




The aim of Study 4 will be to extract data from device user 
manuals to identify what information is communicated to users 
about the security features devices offer and what crime 
prevention messaging is provided by manufacturers.  
 
5.2 Method 
We will obtain a representative sample of 40 open source user 
manuals for different classes of consumer IoT devices sold by 
high-street retailers and systematically code them to extract 
information about what information is communicated by 
security features and what crime prevention messaging is 
presented in manuals.   
 
A coding scheme will be developed by two researchers based 
upon on an analysis of a sub-set of the manuals and will be 
coded qualitatively using framework analysis [30]. We will 
also explore the extent to which this can be automated using 
natural language processing. 
 
5.3 Data Analysis 
• What information relating to security and privacy 
features is communicated to consumers by 
manufacturers? 
• What crime preventing messaging is communicated 
to consumers by manufacturers? 
6 Discussion 
A consumer security index has the potential to influence 
manufacturers to provide greater security provision in 
consumer IoT and also influence consumers to purchase more 
secure devices. Currently, devices are not shipped with 
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adequate security built in and there is no accessible way for 
consumers to understand the likely security afforded by a 
device before buying it (or even after buying it).  Previous 
studies that have discussed security labels for IoT devices have 
not been systematically developed and co-designed with 
consumers or those who might promote them such as 
government policy leads and retailers. By doing so we hope to 
maximise the utility of the label. The series of studies discussed 
above have a number of additional strengths. First, by 
collecting and evaluating data from experts and consumers, it 
will contribute valuable information about how these different 
groups consider the importance and content of the label. 
Secondly, this will be the first label that is systematically 
developed with industry, retailers, consumers and government. 
Third, the inclusion of an analysis of how information is 
communicated in manuals about crime prevention messaging 
provides valuable information about how security features are 
currently explained to consumers and how manufacturers 
might encourage protective behaviour.  
 
6.1 Limitations 
A limitation of the studies is the reliance on consumers’ 
hypothetical engagement with the label. This may limit the 
applicability of the findings to actual uptake of the label in the 
wild. The studies outlined here represent the initial 
development of the CSI but future experimental work will be 
required to objectively assess the effectiveness of different 
design concepts on consumer purchasing behaviour.  
 
6.2 Dissemination and Implementation  
We will increase awareness of the Consumer Security Index 
through dissemination of the work and implementation of the 
findings. 
 
We will promote the CSI to maximise its potential to influence 
market forces. To achieve this, we will engage in the following 
dissemination activities.  The findings from this study will first 
be disseminated to the PETRAS Internet of Things Research 
Hub, government departments (DCMS, Home Office and 
National Cyber Security Centre) and industry partners. Second, 
we will disseminate to the public and wider community 
through IoTUK.  Finally, we will disseminate to academic 
researchers and policymakers via academic conference 
presentations and journal articles. 
 
6.3 Ethics 
The research outlined in this protocol paper will be approved 
by the University College London Research Ethics Committee. 
All procedures performed in the studies involving human 
participants will be conducted in accordance with the ethical 
standards of this committee and with the 1964 Declaration of 
Helsinki and its later amendments. Informed consent will be 
obtained from all individual participants.  
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